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vincing arguments used give these conclusions added stature.6" Every
person interested in this vital industry should read this book. Both the
authors and the American Petroleum Institute are to be congratulated
for the parts they played in its production.
CHARLES M. HEWITTt

THE STATE LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTION. By Jefferson B. Fordham.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1959. Pp. 109. $2.75.

This slim little volume compiles three lectures that Dean Fordham
gave at the West Virginia Law School in April 1957. Its slimness, fortunately, is no index of its significance. The main thesis lies in the first
two lectures, which examine the present-day state legislature. A third
lecture deals with the subsidiary question of legislative sanctions. I shall
confine my comments largely to the first two.
It is not surprising that Fordham should find many inadequacies in
the typical state legislature. What is surprising is the degree to which
these inadequacies reflect a distrust of the practical workings of representative democracy. In a nation that professes so strongly its love of
popular government it is remarkable how far the states have down-graded
their legislative branches. Had the emergence of a strong Federal government meant a corresponding lessening of state responsibilities, this
down-grading might not be significant. But the contrary is true: governmental responsibility has been increasing at all levels. All the more
reason, then, to provide an adequate state legislative branch.
The biggest difficulty, says Fordham, is that in most states the legislature meets every other year and in many states only for periods limited
by constitution. Special sessions are at the mercy of the governors, who
alone can call them and prescribe the subjects that can be taken up. Legislative discontinuity is completed by the fact that between sessions even
standing legislative committees have no legal status. The upshot is that
the typical state has an inadequate main policy-making body in an era
when the legislature has come to replace the court "as the prime agency
of law reform" (p. 17).
64. For example, Rostow and Sacks, Entry into the Oil Refining Business: Vertical Integration Re-examined, 61 YALE L.J. 856 (1952). WHITNEY, op. cit. supra, note 6
suggested that crude production be related to MER. Virtually every disinterested scholar
since John Ise wrote THE UNITED STATES OIL POLICY (1926) has suggested some

changes for the production level of the industry.
t Associate Professor of Business Law, Indiana University.
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This inadequacy is aggravated by miscellaneous restrictions on the
substantive powers of the legislature. These cover such matters as private corporations, municipal home rule, the spending of state revenues,
and tax levies. Here, Fordham traces the prime fault to the state constitutions, in which he says that there should be "a minimum of constitutional provisions, beyond a bill of rights, operating as limitations upon
the policy-making power and responsibilities of the legislature" (p. 27).
The author also has little patience with the myriad constitutional
technicalities relating to parliamentary procedure or to the form and content of bills, such as technicalities relating to titles and amendments. Congress has almost none of these to contend with and does not appear to be
the worse for it. My own experience with the preparation of Federal
legislation supports this judgment.
Because legislative policy-making is a continuing responsibility,
Fordham urges the adoption of annual sessions without arbitrary limitations on length. Special session should be callable also by a majority of
the legislature and should not be circumscribed as to subject.
Fordham believes that once legislative continuity is achieved the
most needed improvement is to bolster the committee system. This he
would accomplish by limiting the number and size of committees, providing them with more adequate professional services, giving them continuing status between sessions, providing for more effective hearing
procedures, departing from a pure seniority system for selecting chairmen, and, particularly, providing for recording their deliberations and
expanding their reports on proposed legislation to include specific reasons for the actions they take. He would also grant them the power to
investigate the performance of the respective executive departments.
The result would be to approximate the situation now obtaining in
Congress, where the committee system works far more effectively. On
the other hand, Fordham does not say how he would cope with one of the
big weaknesses of the present Congressional system, the failure to develop an adequate system for coordinating the work of the several
committees. Galloway, for one, has deplored the fact that our current
Federal approach has produced no better than a federation of committees in which each committee chairman is king of a separate and largely
autonomous domain. In such a framework it is difficult to develop coherent national policy.'
While deploring the general inadequacies of modern-day state legislatures, Fordham notes with satisfaction a recent and wholesome de1.
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velopment: the growth of governmental agencies concentrating respectively on legislative reference, law revision, and bill drafting. These,
while not yet universal, have made solid contributions.
He is somewhat less enthusiastic about the growth of the legislative
council, which appeared first in Kansas (1933). Although helpful in
plugging some of the policy-programming holes in legislative continuity,
he considers it an improvisation at best, a temporary patchwork solution
to a problem better solved through unrestricted annual sessions and better equipped legislative committees.
The author spends some of his most powerful ammunition on the
bicameral legislature. Not being a close student of the question, I will
not challenge the validity of his conclusion. It is probably sound. I can
only say that were my views on the subject to depend on the specific
arguments advanced in the book I might remain something less than
fully persuaded that the unicameral legislature is preferable. On the basis of strength and efficiency, I think he makes out a good case. But
nowhere in the book do I find tangible evidence that the unicameral
legislature produces in the long run results that are as sound and wise as
those produced by the bicameral legislature. A unicameral legislature
may be "stronger" (in what connection does he use the term?) and
"more efficient," perhaps, but is it inherently "more able"? Certainly,
efficiency, economy, speed, and mere "strength" are not hallmarks of
democratic institutions.
It is significant, of course, that unicameralism has been adopted in
Nebraska, Guam, the Virgin Islands, Norway, Finland, Turkey, and all
the Canadian provinces except Quebec. But in what respect that fact is
significant is not so clear. It must signify, of course, that unicameralism is neither impossible nor impracticable. But does it also signify that
unicameralism is equal or superior to bicameralism, which has been
adopted in so many more jurisdictions?
Bicameralism, says Fordham, means a diffusion of responsibility
and buck passing. Although the relationship between size and diffusion
of responsibility is clear, the proposition that a bicameral legislature
necessarily involves more diffusion and buck passing than a unicameral
legislature of equal aggregate size is somewhat less obvious. Even so,
recent conversations with state legislators support the assertion. But it
does not follow that buck passing is always bad. With the sudden and
impulsive pressures that it meets, a legislature needs ways of cushioning
or deflecting blows that might otherwise stampede it into unwise actions.
One who has watched a legislature in the closing hours of a legislative
session has seen the dangerous possibilities.
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The observation that in "charitable, educational, and business organizations, the thought of a bicameral governing body is nothing short
of startling" (p. 30) strikes me as true but of doubtful relevance. Nor
am I overwhelmed by the information that the academicians generally
favor unicameralism while the practical politicians do not. The implication, it would seem, is that the former are as a body infallible, while the
latter are motivated only by spurious considerations. I am not so sure.2
As for the need for checks and balances, Fordham argues that the
check of bicameralism is unnecessary, since numerous checks already exist quite apart from the bicameral system. "Obvious examples are the
executive veto, the courts, and popular opinion" (p. 33). In the alternative, the same argument could be used, with equal force, to abolish the
executive veto or any one of several other checks. In so intricate a
scheme of checks and balances it is hard to say which are essential and
which are superfluous. Somehow, in the big, lumbering inefficiency of
bicameral deliberations there appears to be a crude institutional wisdom
that is not, without the fullest deliberation, to be traded for the results
of an obviously more streamlined machinery. The public consciousness
develops with glacial slowness and it is valuable to maintain a legislative
institution whose creative imagination is not likely to outrun the ponderous movement of public consensus, without whose support the most
perfect laws that human reason can devise are but pieces of parchment.
In short, I would feel much more comfortable with Fordham's espousal
of unicameralism if he had found more persuasive arguments. Perhaps
little more could have been done.
In marshaling support for all these reforms, Fordham solicits the
aid of the lawyers, even though their court-oriented training and thinking have made them inclined to blindness in matters affecting branches
of government other than the judicial. It remains one of the curiosities
of our legal system that the focus of legal thinking remains almost always on the courts. Surely the shrinking significance of the courts in
shaping the substance of law will someday direct attention to the wider
horizons of the fully oriented lawyer needed in modern society. Unfortunately, as Fordham points out, the study of legislative problems has
too often been a study of judicial behavior with respect to those problems
instead of a study of the problems themselves.
2. In its recent preliminary report (October 7, 1959), the Committee on Legislative Processes of the National Legislative Conference, composed of state legislators
and members of legislative service agencies, while refraining from endorsing unicameralism, was objective enough to recommend the adoption of some of Dean Fordham's other
specific objectives.
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I hope that I may be pardoned for slighting the third lecture, the
one on legislative sanctions. Except as it may represent a special interest
of the author, I see little warrant for selecting this particular subsidiary
subject to complete so important a trilogy. However significant it may
be as a current preoccupation, it is in this setting anticlimactic. While
it is undoubtedly an admirable survey of the subject, I will leave the
soundness of that appraisal to others closer to the subject than I.
Altogether, I found Dean Fordham's book stimulating and instructive. I commend it to anyone interested in the structure of sound democratic government.
REED DICKERSoNt

(3rd
New York: Matthew Bender & Company.
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ed.). By Chester Rohrlich.
1959. Pp. xii, 534. $15.00.

Considering its excellence and its potential usefulness to a sizable
portion of the general practitioners of law, Organizing Corporate and
Other Business Enterpriseshas received surprisingly little attention from
the reviewers in legal periodicals. There were five reviews' of the first
edition which was published in 1948, no reviews of the revised or second
edition published in 1953 and so far there has been only a "booknote" 2
on the third edition. Unlike quite a few other recent books designed
primarily for the general practicing lawyer, I think this book is well
worth the money at least for lawyers who expect to be called upon from
time to time to assist in the organization of a new business enterprise
or for advice in making any fundamental change in the character,
form or ownership of an existing business. To such a lawyer the book
should prove invaluable in bringing him abreast of current developments
in the fields of federal taxation and close corporations, i.e., achieving
partnership advantages for corporations. For a bound book the author
and publisher do a remarkable job of including current material. There
is a discussion of or reference to the so-called "tax option corporation,"
(enabling legislation became effective on September 2, 1958) at all relevant points. Although the preface is dated October 1958, cases and law
t Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1. Field, 63 HARV. L. REv. 727 (1950); Sandgren, 24 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 187
L. Rzv. 323 (1949); Wright, 4 MIA'I L. Q. 266
(1949) ; Wilkinson, 18 FORDIIA
(1950) ; Zacharias, 27 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 261 (1949).
2. 33 CONN. B. J. 91 (1959).

